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An Indigent Criminal Defendant Is
Entitled to "An Expert of His Own"
Fredrick E. Vars*

Abstract
The Supreme Court recently heard the case of an Alabama
death row inmate, James McWilliams. A thus far overlooked
argument could save his life and help level the playing field in other
capital cases. The Court in 1985 promised independent expertise.
Now is its chance to make good on that promise.

* Professor, University of Alabama School of Law. Thanks to David Patton
and Monique Fields for helpful comments on earlier drafts.
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The Supreme Court recently heard arguments in the appeal of
an Alabama death row inmate, James McWilliams. 1 An overlooked
argument could save his life and help level the playing field in
other capital cases.
McWilliams was charged with rape and murder. 2 He could not
afford a lawyer, so one was assigned to him by the court. 3 Before
trial, his lawyer asked for and was granted a psychiatric
evaluation. 4 McWilliams, on psychotropic medication at trial, was
convicted. 5 Just two days prior to the judicial sentencing hearing,
the state produced an expert report stating that McWilliams
suffered from "cortical dysfunction attributable to right cerebral
hemisphere dysfunction." 6
At the hearing, McWilliams's attorney requested a
continuance to get a second opinion from an independent expert,
so as to understand both the report and the voluminous mental
health records that were produced by the state at the last minute. 7
That request was denied.8 As a result, McWilliams presented only
his own and his mother's testimony during the sentencing phase.9
Both described McWilliams's head trauma and poor mental
health.1 0 In rebuttal, the state presented its own experts' mental
health testimony." An aggravating factor is a prerequisite for a
death sentence, so the state also offered evidence of three such
factors, including a past felony conviction. 12 The judge sentenced
McWilliams to death. 13
The question presented now is whether a 1985 Supreme Court
1. McWilliams v. Dunn, No. 16-5294 (S. Ct. argued Apr. 24, 2017).
2. Brief for Petitioner at 5, McWilliams v. Dunn, No. 16-5294 (S. Ct. Feb.
27, 2017), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme
court preview/briefs 2016_2017/16-5294 pet. authcheckdam.pdf.
3.
Id.

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

8.
9.
5.
5-6.
6.
12.
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case, Ake v. Oklahoma,14 clearly established that an indigent
defendant who needs an expert is entitled to one who is
independent of the prosecution. The parties have presented
competing views of Ake, 15 which were thoroughly vetted at oral
argument. 16
McWilliams has the stronger argument. The motivating
principle of Ake is to "assure a proper functioning of the adversary
process."1 7 Consistent with that principle, Ake speaks of
"psychiatrists for each party."18 This is more than a passing
reference. Later, the Court explained that the defense expert
should "assist in preparing the cross-examination of a State's
psychiatric witnesses."1 9 This obviously makes no sense if the
defense expert is also the state's expert. Clearly, the defense expert
must be independent. 20
This clarity is not diminished by Ake's statement that a
defendant has no "constitutional right to choose a psychiatrist of
his personal liking or to receive funds to hire his own." 2 1 Out of

context, one might infer from this statement that defendants are
not entitled to experts of their own. But the Court immediately
slams the door on this inference, explaining that the right to an
expert is analogous to the right to counsel. 22 Indigent defendants
can obviously be assigned attorneys rather than be given money to
14. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
15. See generally Brief for Petitioner, McWilliams v. Dunn, No. 16-5294 (S.
Ct. Feb. 27, 2017); Brief for Respondent, McWilliams v. Dunn, No. 16-5294 (S. Ct.
Mar. 29, 2017); Reply Brief of Petitioner, McWilliams v. Dunn, No. 16-5294 (S.
Ct.
Apr.
17,
2017).
These
briefs
are
available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/preview home/20162017 briefs/165294.html.
16. See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, McWilliams v. Dunn, No.
16-5294 (S. Ct. 2017), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral arguments/argument
transcripts/2016/16-5294_g314.pdf.
17. Ake, 470 U.S. at 77 (emphasis added).
18. Id. at 81.
19. Id. at 82.
20. See Carlton Bailey, Ake v. Oklahoma and an Indigent Defendant's

'Right'to an Expert Witness: A PromiseDenied or Imagined?, 10 Wm. &MARY BILL
RTs. J. 401, 458 (2002) (arguing that "courts which hold that Ake may be satisfied
by a neutral expert . . . misread Ake").
21. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985).
22. See id. at 76 (discussing the right to counsel as part of a defendant's
right to meaningful access to justice).
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hire one of their choosing. 2 3 Still, an assigned attorney must
zealously and independently pursue the defendant's interests, not
those of the prosecution. 24 A court retains the authority to deny
funds for a particular expert, but not to deny an expert altogether.
But another strong argument for McWilliams remains hidden
in plain sight. All of the discussion above involves a defendant's
right to an expert on the question of insanity in the guilt phase of
trial. In a separate section, Ake left no doubt that an indigent
criminal defendant is entitled to "an expert of his own" "when the
State presents psychiatric evidence of the defendant's future
dangerousness" during capital sentencing. 25 Allowing psychiatric
evidence of future dangerousness, the Court explained, is premised
on a defendant being able to present "the opposing views of the
defendant's doctors" and "a well-informed expert's opposing
view." 26 Moreover, the expert assistance for defendant is to include
"assistance in preparation at the sentencing phase." 2 7
There are good reasons the parties and the Court missed the
relevance of this proposition for McWilliams. First, the state in
Mc Williams did not expressly assert future dangerousness. 2 8 But
it no less injected future dangerousness into the case by
introducing evidence of a prior felony conviction. 29 Felony
convictions are often relied upon to establish future
23. See John M. West, Expert Services and the Indigent CriminalDefendant:
The ConstitutionalMandate of Ake v. Oklahoma, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1326, 1346
(1986) (arguing that "in all respects except the defendant's free choice of his
expert, a 'partisan' expert is constitutionally required").
24. See Paul C. Giannelli, The Right to Defense Experts, 18 CRIM. JUST. 15,
18 (2003) (analogizing the right to a defense expert with the right to defense
counsel).
25.
Ake, 470 U.S. at 83, 84; cf Ralph Slovenko, Post-Ake Developments on
the Right to PsychiatricAssistance, 23 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 605, 613 (1995) ("Justice
Marshall divided the Ake analysis to address separately the guilt and the
sentencing phases of the trial.").
26.
Ake, 470 U.S. at 84 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see
also Roberson v. Director, TDCJ-CID, No. 2:09cv327, 2014 WL 5343198, at *23
(E.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2014) ("Trial counsel presented a sound trial strategy on the
issue of future dangerousness. He presented an expert to counter the State's
experts and vigorously cross-examined the State's experts.").
27.
Ake, 470 U.S. at 84.
28.
See generally Brief for Petitioner, McWilliams v. Dunn, No. 16-5294 (S.
Ct. Feb. 27, 2017).
29.
Id. at 5.
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dangerousness, 30 and criminal history is a proxy for future
offending. 3 1 The past felony conviction implied that McWilliams
was, and would continue to be, a recidivist.
Second, future dangerousness was not a statutory aggravator
in Alabama, 32 whereas it was in Oklahoma at the time of Ake.33
This is a distinction without a difference. Whether future
dangerousness appears in a statute or comes in by another path is
irrelevant. 34 Either way (like a misdiagnosis in mitigation), it may
determine whether a defendant lives or dies.
Third, the state did not rely initially on psychiatric evidence,
but presented it only in rebuttal. 35 This distinction too is
immaterial. 36 McWilliams's mental health was an issue well before
sentencing and by far the most powerful mitigating factor. There
was no doubt McWilliams would introduce mental health evidence,
so the state had its mental health experts ready for rebuttal.
Surely, the state cannot avoid Ake by reserving its psychiatric
evidence for certain introduction later.
Fourth, the state's psychiatric evidence did not go directly to
future dangerousness. Instead, the state used its experts to argue
that McWilliams was faking his mental illness. 37 That may seem
like a significant distinction given Ake's focus on predicting future
dangerousness. 38 But elsewhere the opinion recognizes that
psychiatrists also "disagree widely and frequently on what
constitutes mental illness" and "on the appropriate diagnosis to be
30.
See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 308 (2002) ("To prove future
dangerousness, the State relied on [defendant's] prior felony convictions as well
as the testimony of four victims of earlier robberies and assaults.").
31.
BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND
PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE 188 (2007).
32.
See generally ALA. CODE § 13A-5-49 (1975).

33.
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 86 (1985).
34.
Buttrum v. Black, 721 F. Supp. 1268, 1311 n.9 (N.D. Ga. 1989)
(discussing future dangerousness as an aggravating factor).
35.
Brief for Petitioner at 5, McWilliams v. Dunn, No. 16-5294 (S. Ct. Feb.
27, 2017).
36.
See Castro v. Oklahoma, 71 F.3d 1502, 1514-1515 (10th Cir. 1995)
(finding that the Ake duty to provide a defense expert is triggered anytime the
State presents evidence of future dangerousness).
37.
Brief for Petitioner at 7, McWilliams v. Dunn, No. 16-5294 (S. Ct. Feb.
27, 2017).
38.
See generally Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 84 (1985).
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attached to given behavior." 39 Detecting false symptoms is
particularly difficult. 4 0 Expertise is as critical here, and the stakes

are the same, as with future dangerousness.
When these factors are properly understood, it is even clearer
Ake established that McWilliams was entitled to an independent
expert.
Why are independent experts particularly important in
capital sentencing? Ake explains that "[t]he State . . . has a
profound interest in assuring that its ultimate sanction is not
erroneously imposed." 41 In capital sentencing, mitigation evidence
can directly tip the scale for or against death. Conviction of a crime,
on the other hand, cannot lead automatically to a sentence of
death. 42 Rather, a death sentence may be imposed only after
consideration of all factors, including "the character and record of
the individual offender." 43 This is a well-established constitutional
requirement, whereas the Court has not decided whether the
insanity defense is constitutionally required. 44
These considerations indicate that the Ake duty to provide an
independent expert should cover sentencing in every death penalty
case. 4 5 The state should be required to provide a psychiatric expert
even when future dangerousness is not squarely at issue.
"[P]sychiatric testimony is generally of critical importance to the
sentencing determination, covering issues of rehabilitative

39.
40.

Id. at 81.
See Phillip J. Resnick & James Knoll, Faking It: How to Detect
MalingeredPsychosis, 4 CURRENT PSYCHIATRY 12, 14 (2005) ("No other syndrome
is as easy to define yet so difficult to diagnose as malingering.").
41. Ake, 470 U.S. at 83-84; see also id. at 87 (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("In
capital cases the finality of the sentence imposed warrants protections that may
or may not be required in other cases.").
42. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 301 (1976) (finding that a
mandatory death sentence statute violates the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments).
43. Id. at 304 (plurality opinion).
44. See Clarkv. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 752 n.20 (2006) ("We have never held
that the Constitution mandates an insanity defense, nor have we held that the
Constitution does not so require.").
45. See Susan S. Brown, After Ake: Implementing the Tools of an Adequate
Defense, 7 PACE L. REV. 201, 240-41 (1986) ("For psychiatric defense assistance
at a capital sentencing proceeding, a defendant need not make the same threshold
showing as must be made to obtain such assistance at trial.").
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potential, future dangerousness, and individual culpability." 46 And
not just psychiatric evidence is essential. In all capital cases,
"because the defendant's medical, psychological, sociological, and
family background must all be thoroughly investigated, counsel
must seek out assistance from mitigation specialists." 4 7 Not
providing indigent defendants this assistance thwarts their efforts
to marshal mitigating evidence.
Another Supreme Court case, Wiggins v. Smith, 48 is
instructive. In that case, the Court sustained a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel because the defense attorney failed to
adequately investigate social history and therefore failed to
uncover powerful evidence of sexual abuse. 49 One commentator
correctly observed that, "[a]t a key point in its opinion, the Court
chastised defense counsel for failing to 'commission' a social history
report '[d]espite the fact that the Public Defender's office made
funds available for the retention of a forensic social worker."'5 0 In
other words, the Court instructed defense counsel to "commission"
an expert report, not just rely on the state's expert. A
constitutional duty to gather mitigating evidence is meaningful
only if indigent defendants are provided with independent expert
help. 51
Independent experts are especially important when mental
health is involved. The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized
that mental health is relevant in death penalty cases. 52 But mental
46. Satterwhite
concurring).

v. Texas,

486 U.S.

249,

264 (1988)

(Marshall,

J.,

47. Craig M. Cooley, Mapping the Monster's Mental Health and Social
History: Why CapitalDefense Attorneys and PublicDefender Death Penalty Units
Require the Services of Mitigation Specialists, 30 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 23, 53
(2005); cf Fredrick E. Vars, ProsecutorialMisconduct: The Best Defense Is a Good
Defense, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 465, 469 (2016) (arguing that "one key
component of support should be mitigation specialists").
48.
539 U.S. 510 (2003).
49. Id. at 523-27.
50.
ConstitutionalLaw, 117 HARv. L. REV. 278, 284 (2003) (quoting Wiggins,
539 U.S. at 524).
51.
See id. at 287 (arguing that Ake and Wiggins signal that "the
Constitution requires the retention of mitigation specialists" in every capital
sentencing).

52. See Michael L. Perlin, 'Merchants and Thieves, Hungry for Power":
Prosecutorial Misconduct and Passive Judicial Complicity in Death Penalty
Trials ofDefendants with MentalDisabilities, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1501, 1501
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health evidence is more than just relevant in capital sentencingit is essential. The Court has held that the absence of an
instruction informing the jury that it could consider as mitigating
the defendant's mental condition, which arguably made him less
culpable, violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 53 The
Court has also held that counsel's failure to uncover and present
evidence of defendant's mental health at the penalty phase of a
death penalty case was ineffective assistance of counsel. 54 Holding
that mental health evidence is essential in mitigation without
providing indigent defendants a genuine opportunity to uncover
and present such evidence undermines the properly functioning
"adversary process" that Ake is meant to protect."
The Court in Ake promised independent expertise at least in
capital sentencing. It has a chance now to make good on that
promise, and perhaps save a life in the process.

(2016) (citing Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014); Panettiv. Quarterman, 551
U.S. 930 (2007); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); Fordv. Wainwright, 477
U.S. 399 (1986)).
53.
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 322-328 (1989), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
54.
Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 38-40 (2009); accord Wiggins v. Smith,

539 U.S. 510 (2003).
55.

Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985).

